Motivated by the recent experience of the U.S. and the Eurozone, we describe the quantitative properties of a New Keynesian model with a zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates, explicitly accounting for the nonlinearities that the bound brings. Besides showing how such a model can be e¢ ciently computed, we …nd that the behavior of the economy is substantially a¤ected by the presence of the ZLB. In particular, we document 1) the unconditional and conditional probabilities of hitting the ZLB; 2) the unconditional and conditional probabilty distributions of the duration of a spell at the ZLB; 3) the responses of output to government expenditure shocks at the ZLB, 4) the distribution of shocks that send the economy to the ZLB; and 5) the distribution of shocks that keep the economy at the ZLB.
Introduction
How does the economy behave when it faces the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate? To answer this basic question in macroeconomics, we build a New Keynesian model with the ZLB and solve it nonlinearly using a projection method and rational expectations. Besides showing how the model can be e¢ ciently computed, this paper documents 1) the unconditional and conditional probabilities of hitting the ZLB; 2) the unconditional and conditional probability distributions of the duration of a spell at the ZLB; 3) the distributions of shocks that send the economy to the ZLB and the ones that keep it there; 4) the responses of output to government expenditure shocks at the ZLB; and 5) the impulse response functions of the economy at and away from the ZLB. However, the quantitative analysis of the ZLB is complicated by the essential nonlinearity that it generates. Along the equilibrium path of the model, the nominal interest rate is a function of the states of the economy and government policy. Since, in the typical model, the nominal interest rate will be zero for some states of the economy and government policies but not for others, the function that determines interest rates must be nonlinear. This nonlinearity is an obstacle both for traditional linearizations techniques and for the increasingly popular higher-order perturbations. These methods, by construction, cannot handle the ZLB in a model with rational expectations.
The literature has tried to get around this problem using di¤erent approaches. We highlight three of the most in ‡uential. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) log-linearize the equilibrium relations except for the ZLB constraint, which is retained in its exact form. They then solve the corresponding system of linear expectational di¤erence equations with the linear inequality constraint. To obtain numerical results, Eggertsson and Woodford assume a 2-state Markov chain with an absorbing state for an exogenous disturbance that drives the dynamics of the model. 1 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) linearize the two models they use: a simple model without capital and a model with capital. In the …rst model, they assume that there is a 2-state Markov chain with an absorbing state for the discount factor.
The economy starts with a high discount factor that sends the nominal interest rate to zero and, in every period, there is a probability that the discount factor will move to its long run value and never change again. In the model with capital, the path for the discount factor (and hence, for the economy, conditional on some …scal policy) is deterministic. Braun and Körber (2010) employ a variant of extended shooting, which solves the model forward for an exogenously …xed number of periods (after which the economy reverts to the steady state)
given some initial conditions and assuming that in these periods, shocks are set to zero.
Although a big step toward understanding the ZLB, the existing solutions have made sim- for quantities important to policy analysis such as the size of the …scal multiplier.
We address these nonlinear interactions and the time-varying distributions of future events by computing a fully nonlinear New Keynesian model with a ZLB and rational expectations.
We incorporate monetary and …scal policy and a set of shocks that push the model into the ZLB. In that way, the agents in the model have the right expectations about the probability of hitting the ZLB. To solve the model, we approximate the equilibrium functions of consumption, in ‡ation, and one auxiliary variable that controls the pricing decision of …rms as a nonlinear function of the states. More concretely, we employ Chebyshev polynomials as a basis for the projection of these endogenous variables on the states of the model. Since we are working in a high-dimensional space, the coe¢ cients are solved for with the Smolyak collocation method laid out in . This method signi…cantly reduces the burden of the curse of dimensionality. However, to maintain tractability and provide easier insight, we will specify a relatively simple model with only …ve state variables. Once we have the nonlinear functions for consumption, in ‡ation, and the one auxiliary variable, we exploit the rest of the equilibrium conditions of the model to solve for all other variables of interest. In particular, we …nd the nominal interest rate from the exact Taylor rule with a ZLB with its kink at zero holding exactly. This feature of our solution method is crucial because it allows us to circumvent the di¢ culty in directly approximating a non-di¤erentiable function. Next, we simulate the model to calculate its moments, asking questions such as what is the e¤ect of …scal policy when the economy is at the ZLB. Our research …nds inspiration in Wolman (1998) , who solved a simpler sticky prices model using …nite elements. The main di¤erence is that our model considers a larger set of shocks and it is closer to the ones that have been taken successfully to the data and employed in applied policy analysis. Thus, we can o¤er quantitative assessments of issues such as the size of …scal multipliers, which are at the heart of the current policy discussion. 2 Our main …ndings are:
1. The dynamics of the economy near or at the ZLB are poorly approximated by a linear solution.
2. The economy spends 5.53 percent of the time at the ZLB (one of each 18 quarters), and the average duration of a spell at the ZLB is 2.06 quarters with a variance of 3.33.
In our simulation, the duration of spells at the ZLB may last up to one decade.
3. The expected duration and the variance of the number of additional periods at the ZLB is time-varying. Furthermore, the number of expected periods and its variance grows with the number of periods already spent at the ZLB. This has been a point overlooked in the past, but it is important for the assessment of …scal policy.
4. Positive shocks to the discount factor or to productivity raise the probability of the economy hitting the ZLB. Shocks on monetary or …scal policy have little e¤ect on this probability. While most previous literature has focused on shocks to the discount factor, we highlight the importance of positive shocks to productivity as a force pushing the economy to the ZLB.
5. The ZLB is associated with output, consumption, and in ‡ation below their steady-state values; although, given the rich stochastic structure of the model, it is not always the case. In our simulation, we observe quarters with positive in ‡ation, while the ZLB binds.
6. When the economy is hit by a discount factor shock that sends it to the ZLB for an average of 4 quarters, the multiplier of government expenditure at impact is around 3 times larger than when the economy is outside the bound. 2 After the …rst draft of this paper was completed, we became aware of two recent attempts at solving a New Keynesian model with ZLB nonlinearly. Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2011) use a cluster-grid algorithm that shares some similarities with our solution method. However, the main thrust of the paper is computational, and they solve only the New Keynesian model as a brief illustration of their method, without a complete analysis of its numerical properties. Tanaka (2012) uses a variation of the time iteration algorithm proposed by Coleman (1991) , but he has only one state variable and focuses only on some aspects of the model. 7 . Since the model is nonlinear, we need to distinguish between the marginal multiplier (the response of the economy to an in…nitesimal innovation in government expenditure) and the average multiplier (the response of the economy to an innovation in government expenditure of size x; see, for the same distinction, Erceg and Lindé (2010) ). The marginal multiplier is substantially larger than the average one.
8. When the economy is hit by a shock that sends it to the ZLB for an average of 2 quarters, the multiplier is only around twice as large as when the economy is outside the bound. Further, the multiplier is close to 1.
9. Increases on the variance of the additional number of periods at the ZLB lower the …scal multiplier.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a baseline New Keynesian model and we calibrate it to the U.S. economy. In section 3, we show how we compute the model nonlinearly. In section 4, we compare the solution that we obtain with the resulting one from a linearization. Section 5 presents our quantitative …ndings and section 6 concludes. A technical appendix o¤ers some further details on the solution of the model.
The Model
Our investigation is built around a baseline New Keynesian model, which has often been used to frame the discussion of the e¤ects of the ZLB. The structure of the economy is as follows. A representative household consumes, saves, and supplies labor. The …nal output is assembled by a …nal good producer who uses as inputs a continuum of intermediate goods manufactured by monopolistic competitors. The intermediate good producers rent labor from the household. Also, these intermediate good producers can only change prices following Calvo's rule. Finally, there is a government that …xes the one-period nominal interest rate, sets taxes, and consumes. We have four shocks: one to the time discount factor, one to technology, one to monetary policy, and one to …scal policy.
Household
There is a representative household that maximizes a lifetime utility function separable in consumption c t and hours worked l t ;
where # is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity and t is the discount factor. The discount factor follows a law of motion
Thus, the discount factor ‡uctuates around its mean with a persistence b and innovations " b;t+1 . We normalize 0 = .
The household trades Arrow securities (which we do not discuss further to save on notation) and a nominal government bond b t that pays a nominal gross interest rate of R t : Then, given a price level p t , the household's budget constraint is
where w t is the real wage, T t is a lump-sum transfer, and z t are the pro…ts of the …rms in the economy. Finally, the household, as all agents in the economy, has rational expectations about the evolution of the variables in the model.
The …rst-order conditions of this problem are
The …nal good producer
There is one …nal good y t produced using intermediate goods y it and the technology
where " is the elasticity of substitution. Final good producers are perfectly competitive and maximize pro…ts subject to the production function (1), taking as given all intermediate goods prices p ti and the …nal good price p t . The input demand functions associated with this problem are
and the price level is
Intermediate good producers
Each intermediate …rm produces di¤erentiated goods using y it = A t l it , where l it is the amount of the labor input rented by the …rm. Productivity A t follows
where A is the average productivity level. Therefore, the real marginal cost of the intermediate good producer, common across all …rms, is mc t = 
where t+s is the Lagrangian multiplier for the household in period t + s.
The solution for the …rm's pricing problem has a recursive structure in two auxiliary variables x 1;t and x 2;t that satisfy "x 1;t = (" 1) x 2;t and have laws of motion
and
is the ratio between the optimal new price (common across all …rms that reset their prices) and the price of the …nal good. Also, by the properties of Calvo pricing, in ‡ation dispersion is given by 1 =
The government
The government sets the nominal interest rates according to R t = max [Z t ; 1] where
The variable represents the steady-state target level of in ‡ation and R is the steady-state nominal gross return of bonds (equal to divided by ). The term m t is a random shock to monetary policy that follows m t = exp ( m " m;t ) with " m;t distributed according to N (0; 1).
This policy rule is the maximum of two terms. The …rst term, Z t , follows a conventional Taylor rule that depends on the lagged interest rate, the deviation of in ‡ation with respect to its target, and the output gap (R 1 r appears on the right-hand side because we move R from the left-hand side of the equation). The second term is the ZLB: the gross nominal interest rate cannot be lower than 1.
Beyond the open market operations, the lump-sum transfers also …nance a stream of government expenditures g t with g t = s g;t y t and
Because of Ricardian irrelevance, the timing of these transfers is irrelevant, so we set b t = 0 period by period. The evolution of g t is expressed in terms of its share of output, s g;t . 
Aggregation
Aggregate demand is given by y t = c t + g t . By well-known arguments, aggregate supply is
where:
is the aggregate loss of e¢ ciency induced by price dispersion of the intermediate goods. By the properties of Calvo pricing,
Equilibrium
The de…nition of equilibrium in this model is standard. This equilibrium is given by the sequence fy t ; c t ; l t ; mc t ; x 1;t ; x 2;t ; w t ; t ; t ; v t ; R t ; Z t ; t ; A t ; m t ; g t ; b t ; s g;t g 1 t=0 determined by:
the …rst-order conditions of the household
government policy
in ‡ation evolution and price dispersion
market clearing
and the stochastic processes
The steady state of the model is given by fy; c; l; mc; x 1 ; x 2 ; w; ; ; v; R; Z; ; A; m; g; b; s g g, where we have eliminated subindexes to denote a steady-state value of the variable. See the appendix for details.
Calibration
We calibrate the model to standard choices in the literature. We start with the preferences parameters. We set = 0:994 to match a real interest rate at the steady state of roughly 2.5 percent on an annual basis, # = 1 to deliver a Frisch elasticity of 1 (in the range of the numbers reported when we consider both the intensive and the extensive margin of labor supply), and = 1; a normalization of the hours worked that is nearly irrelevant for our results. As it is common in the New Keynesian literature, we set the Calvo parameter and, to save on the dimensionality of the problem, r = 0 (this is also the case in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011). Then:
For …scal policy, s g = 0:2 so that government expenditures in steady state account for 20 percent of output, which is close to the average of government consumption in the U.S.
We set, for the discount factor, b = 0:8 and b = 0:0025. Thus, the preference shock has a half-life of roughly 3 quarters and an unconditional standard deviation of 0:42 percent. With these values, our economy hits the ZLB with a frequency consistent with values previously reported (see section 5 below for details). For the technology process, we set A = 1, a = 0:9;
and a = 0:0025. These numbers are lower than those used in Cooley and Prescott (1995) to re ‡ect the lower volatility of productivity in the last two decades. This last value is half of that estimated in Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) . We pick those numbers to avoid numerical problems associated with very persistent …scal shocks when we hit the economy with a large …scal expansion. Since we will document that …scal shocks are less important than preference shocks in sending the economy to the ZLB, this lower persistence is not terribly important.
Solution of the Model
Given the previous calibration, our model has …ve state variables: price dispersion, v t 1 ; the time-varying discount factor, t ; productivity, A t ; the monetary shock, m t ; and the government expenditure share, s g;t . Then, we de…ne the vector of state variables:
S t = (S 1;t ; S 2;t ; S 3;t ; S 4;t ; S 5;t ) = (v t 1 ; t ; A t ; m t ; s g;t ) :
Note that we have one endogenous state variable and four exogenous ones. For convenience,
we also de…ne the vector evaluated at the steady state as S ss = (v; ; 1; 1; s g ) :
Solving nonlinear models with …ve state variables that are not Pareto e¢ cient is challenging. For instance, it is computationally expensive to apply value function iteration techniques or any projection method using the tensor product of one-dimensional polynomials. Instead, we use a projection method-Smolyak's algorithm-in which the number of grid points and the associated number of terms of the approximating polynomial do not grow exponentially in the dimensionality of the problem. This projection method judiciously chooses grid points and polynomials so that their number coincide and so that the function to be approximated is interpolated at the grid points. Although the algorithm is described in detail in the appendix, its basic structure is as follows.
Let the equilibrium functions for c t , t , and x 1;t be written as functions of the states by
where f i : R 5 ! R for i 2 f1; 2; 3g and let f = (f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 ). If we had access to f , we could …nd the values of the remaining endogenous variables using the equilibrium conditions. Since f is unknown, we approximate c t , t , and x 1;t as
To compute b f , we …rst de…ne a hypercube for the state variables (we extrapolate when we need to move outside the hypercube in the simulations) and rely on Smolyak's algorithm to obtain collocation points (grid points) within the hypercube. We guess the values of b f at those collocation points, which implicitly de…ne b f over the entire state space. Then, treating b f as the true time t + 1 functions, we exploit the equilibrium conditions to back out the current c t , t , and x 1;t values at the collocation points and check that those values coincide with the ones implied by b f . If not, we update our guess until convergence. In our application of Smolyak's algorithm, we use polynomials of up to degree 4.
Once we have found b f , from the equilibrium conditions we get an expression for the second auxiliary variable,
output,
and for reset prices,
Then, we get the evolution of price dispersion,
labor,
wages,
and marginal costs,
Now we are ready to determine the interest rate:
Thus, with this procedure, we get a set of functions h t = h (S t ) for the additional variables in our model h t 2 fy t ; l t ; mc t ; x 2;t ; w t ; t ; v t ; R t g.
An important advantage of our procedure is that we solve nonlinearly for c t , t , and x 1;t and only later for the other variables exploiting the remaining equilibrium conditions. Hence, conditional on c t , t , and x 1;t ; our method deals with the kink of R t at 1 in the Taylor rule without any approximation: R t comes from a direct application of the Taylor rule. Also, the functions for c t , t , and x 1;t are derived from equations that involve expectations, which smooth out any possible kinks created by the ZLB.
Comparison between Log-linear and the Nonlinear Solution
Equipped with our nonlinear solution, we can address many important questions. In this section, we start by comparing the decision rules that we just obtained with the ones resulting from a log-linear approximation when we ignore the ZLB, only imposing it ex-post in the simulation (that is, when the Taylor rule would like to set R t < 1, we instead set R t = 1 and continue). We illustrate, in this way, the important di¤erences that the presence of the ZLB generates in the dynamics of the model and motivate the need for a full nonlinear approach.
Our …rst step is to compute the log-linearized decision rules for our model given our calibration. For example, the log-linear decision rule for consumption is given by:
To compare this decision rule with our nonlinear solution, we plot in …gure 4.1 both decision rules along the log t -axis, while we keep the other state variables at their steady-state values.
The decision rule has an overall negative slope because a value of the discount factor above its steady state induces the household to save more, which lowers the real interest rate. Hence, if su¢ ciently large and positive innovations bu¤et the discount factor, the economy may be pushed to the ZLB. We observe this urgency to save more and consume less in the nonlinear policy. Consumption plunges for shocks that push the discount factor 0:7 percent or higher than its steady-state value. This is not a surprise. We calibrated to be 0:994. Then, when the discount factor increases 0.6 percent (0.006 in our graph), t becomes bigger than 1 and future consumption yields more utility than current expenditure. Our projection method is perfectly capable to respond to that feature of the model and capture the change of optimal consumption. 4 In contrast, the log-linear approximation, since it is built around the value of t in the steady state, predicts a stable decline in consumption. This di¤erence becomes stronger as t moves into higher values. If we expanded the horizontal scale, we would observe a bigger di¤erence between the two decision rules. At the same time, the two policies almost coincide for values of the discount factor close to or below its steady state value, where the log-linear approximation is valid. The policy function for in ‡ation (…gure 4.2) con…rms the same pattern as in the previous plot. As the discount factor becomes bigger, there is less aggregate demand today, and this pushes in ‡ation down as those …rms that reset their prices do not raise them as much as they would otherwise do. In the nonlinear solution, this phenomenon of contraction-de ‡ation becomes acuter as increases and the economy moves toward the ZLB.
In conclusion, nonlinearities matter when we talk about the ZLB. This point will be even clearer with the …ndings of the next section. 
Probability of being at the ZLB
Our …rst exercise is to derive the probability that the economy is at the ZLB in any particular period. This step is important because, in our model, the entry and exit from the ZLB is endogenous. The spells are caused by the interaction of the exogenous state variables (which have a continuous distribution over many values) and the endogenous state. Thus, we compute the integral
for all t 1, where I B [f (x)] : R n ! f0; 1g, is the indicator function of a set B R k and
for any n, and where (S t ) is the unconditional distribution of the states of the economy.
We further de…ne
, where is the identity map.
Given our solution from section 3, we simulate the model for T = 300; 000 periods starting at S ss . We de…ne the sequence of simulated states as fS i;ss g
, where S i;ss is the value of the state vector in period i of the simulation when the initial condition is S ss . 6 Using this sequence, we follow Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005) to approximate equation (3) by
From equation (4) we learn that our economy is at the ZLB during 5.53 percent of quarters, or approximately 1 out of each 18 quarters, a noticeable share. However, since this percentage was a criterion for the calibration, we do not emphasize it. 7 The probability of being at the ZLB is not independent of the history of states. To show this, we calculate the probability of being at least one extra period at the ZLB conditional on having been at the ZLB for exactly s periods as Pr (fR t = 1g j fR t 1 = 1; : : : ; R t s = 1; R t s 1 > 1g) = Z I f1g [R (S t )] (S t j fR t 1 = 1; : : : ; R t s = 1; R t s 1 > 1g) dS t for all t 3 and t 2 s 1.
If we let R t 1;s = fR t 1 = 1; : : : ; R t s = 1; R t s 1 > 1g for all t 3 and t 2 s 1, then the above expression can be rewritten as 
for M s > 0. When M s is 0, we say c Pr (fR t = 1g jR t 1;s ) = 0. (6) for s from 1 to 10. The probability of being at least one extra period at the ZLB increases from 44 percent conditional on having been at the ZLB for 1 period to 67 percent for 8 periods and decreases thereafter. 8 That is, during the …rst two years of a spell at the ZLB, the longer we have been at the ZLB, the more likely it is we stay there next period. The intuition is simple: if we have been at the ZLB for, say, 4 quarters, it is because the economy has su¤ered a string of bad shocks. Thus, the economy will linger longer on average around the state values that led to the ZLB in the …rst place.
The fact that the probabilities in table 5.1 are not constant over time already points out a feature of our model that will play a key role in the next subsections: the expectation and variance of the time remaining at the ZLB are time-varying.
How long are the spells at the ZLB?
Another important question is to determine the length of the spells of the economy at the ZLB. To answer that question, …rst, we compute the expected number of consecutive periods that the economy will be at the ZLB right after entering it. In mathematical terms:
(S t ; S t+1 ; : : : jR t 1;1 ) dS t dS t+1 : : :
for all t 3, where R t 1;1 describes the event "just entering the ZLB", (S t ; S t+1 ; : : :
is the distribution of the sequence of future states conditional on R t 1;s implied by our model, and T t = T (S t ; S t+1 ; : : :) = min f! : ! 2 f1; 2; : : :g and R t+! 1 = R (S t+! 1 ) > 1g for all t 3 is the …rst period outside the ZLB as a function of the future path of state variables. If T t = 1, then R t > 1 for that path. In the same way, if T t = 2, then R t = 1 and R t+1 > 1 for that path of state variables.
To approximate the expectation in (7), take
and calculate
where we approximate the probability
for all t 3 and T 2 j 1, by for all t 3. The expression (8) equals 2.06 quarters in our simulation. That is, on average, we are at the ZLB for slightly more than half a year after entering it.
We highlight two points. First, given our simulation of T periods, we can be at the ZLB at most T 2 (we need a period before entry and one period of exit of the ZLB). Second, we approximate T S i k 1 ;ss ; S i k 1 +1;ss ; : : : by b T S i k 1 ;ss ; : : : ; S T;ss . But this approximation has no e¤ect as long as R (S T;ss ) > 1, similar to what happens in our simulation.
We can also compute the variance of the number of consecutive periods at the ZLB right after entering it. Again, in mathematical terms: By applying the previous steps, we …nd that the variance is 3.33 quarters. Since the number of consecutive periods at the ZLB is bounded below by 1 quarter (one period in our model), a variance of 3.33 (standard deviation of 1.8 quarters) denotes a quite asymmetric distribution of consecutive periods at the ZLB just after entering it, with a long right tail.
We revisit this issue below. Now, we would like to see how the conditional expectations and variance depend on the number of periods already at the ZLB. First, we calculate the expected number of additional periods at the ZLB conditional on having already been at the ZLB for s periods:
for all t 3 and t 2 s 1, where we are subtracting 1 from T t because we are calculating the number of additional periods at the ZLB. This expression can approximated by: We build the analogous object for the conditional variance: Recall that, given our simulation of T periods, we can be at the ZLB at most T s 1 additional periods (we need s periods before entry and one period of exit of the ZLB).
These two statistics are reported in The results in table 5.2 re ‡ect how the distribution of additional periods at the ZLB is time-varying. This is an important di¤erence of our paper with respect to the literature.
Previous papers have considered two cases. In the …rst one, there is an exogenous variable that switches in every period with some constant probability; the typical change is the discount factor going from low to high. Once the variable has switched, there is a perfect foresight path that exists from the ZLB (see, for instance, Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003) . Although this path may depend on how long the economy has been at the ZLB, there is no uncertainty left once the variable has switched. In the second case, researchers have looked at models with perfect foresight (see, for example, sections IV and V of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011). Even if …scal policy in ‡uences how long we are at the ZLB, there is no uncertainty with respect to events, and the variance is degenerate.
The number of additional periods at the ZLB and the beliefs that agents have about them will play a key role later when we talk about the …scal multiplier. The multiplier will depend on the uncertainty regarding how many more periods the economy will be at the ZLB.
Having more uncertainty will, in general, raise the multiplier. However, the result cannot be ascertained in general because of the skewness of the distribution. By construction, we cannot have less than 0 additional periods at the ZLB. Thus, if the expectation is, for instance, 1.79 quarters and the variance 4.22 (column s = 5 in table 5.2), we must have a large right tail and a concentrated mass on the (truncated) left tail. A higher variance can be caused by movements in di¤erent parts of this asymmetric distribution and, thus, has complex e¤ects on the …scal multiplier (see section 5.7 for details).
What shocks do take us to the ZLB?
We would like to know whether a shock of a given size increases or decreases the probability of hitting the ZLB in the next I periods. More concretely, we would like to compute:
fR t+i = 1g j fS j;t = A j g = Z max I f1g [R (S t+1 )] ; : : : ; I f1g [R (S t+I )] (S t+1 ; : : : ; S t+I j fS j;t = A j g) dS t+1 : : : dS t+I (9) for A j 2 R and where S j;t is the j th element of S t . We perform this analysis only for the exogenous states variables, that is j 2 f2; : : : ; 5g.
To approximate (9) given our solution, we simulate the model N = 10; 000 times for I periods starting at S ss for all states, but for the j th element of S t , which we start at A j . For each simulation n 2 f1; : : : ; N g ; we call the I periods long sequence of states n S A j n;i;ss
Then, we set I = 10 and approximate the probability by:
A j n;1;ss i ; : : : ; I f1g h R S A j n;I;ss i N : Table 5 .3 reports these probabilities when the initial exogenous states are set, one at a time (corresponding to each column), to 0, 1, and 2 standard deviation innovations away from the steady state. In other words, A j = S j;ss f0; 1; 2g j for the discount factor, technology, monetary, and government expenditure. The third row (labeled 0 std) shows a baseline scenario in which all the exogenous states are set at their steady-state values. In this baseline, the probability of getting to the ZLB in the next two and a half years is 15 percent (all the entries in the row are equal, since we are describing the same event). When we have a one-standard-deviation positive innovation to the discount factor, that probability goes up to 20 percent, and when we have a two-standard-deviation innovation to 29 percent. When t is higher than in the steady state, the household is more patient and the interest rate that clears the good market is low. Hence, it is easy for the economy to be pushed into the ZLB.
The reverse results occur when the innovation is negative: the probability of entering into a ZLB falls to 12 percent (one-standard-deviation) or 9 percent (two-standard deviation).
Interestingly, we also …nd that positive productivity shocks raise the probability of being at the ZLB. There are two mechanisms at work here. First, higher productivity means lower in ‡ation: …rms charge a mark-up over their marginal cost and, with higher productivity, costs are going down. Since the monetary authority responds to lower in ‡ation by lowering the nominal interest rate even more (the coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule is = 1:5), this puts the economy closer to the ZLB. Second, when productivity is high, the real interest rate is low. In the absence of capital, the extra output must be consumed for markets to clear. The real interest rate goes down to overcome the desire of the representative household to smooth consumption. This lower real interest rate translates, through the working of the Taylor rule, into a lower nominal interest rate. Often, the ZLB prevents the necessary reduction in the nominal interest rate caused by these two mechanisms. proof that the problems of the economy came from an insu¢ cient aggregate demand. Our previous …nding reinterprets the situation. Far from being just a problem of demand, high productivity may have aggravated the problem of the ZLB (see, for a related point, Eggertsson, 2010). Finally, monetary and …scal policy shocks have a volatility that is too small to make much of a di¤erence with respect to the probability of hitting the ZLB (and the Taylor rule undoes much of their impact). 10 Understanding which shocks lead us to the ZLB is particularly relevant for policymakers who need to assess the conditions of the economy in order to respond to them. Consequently, we can also learn about the distribution of states conditional on being at the ZLB, that is:
Let fS i k ;ss g M k=1 be the M elements subsequence of the sequence fS i;ss g T i=1 such that R (S i k ;ss ) = 1 for all k 2 f1; : : : ; M g. Then, we approximate (10) by:
for any set A R 5 . Since S t 2 R 5 , it is hard to represent equation (11) graphically. Instead, in …gure 5.3 we represent the four individual marginal distributions (fS j;t 2 A j g j fR t = 1g) '
for any set A j R, where S j;t is the j th element of S t and S j;i k ;ss is the j th element of S i k ;ss (again, we drop the distribution for v t 1 , since it has a less straightforward interpretation).
To facilitate comparison, the states are expressed as deviations from their steady state values and we plot, with the red continuous line, the unconditional distribution of the state. 5 .4, where we report the mean and the standard deviation of the four exogenous variables, unconditionally (this is just our calibration of these processes) and conditional at being at the ZLB. The ZLB is associated with high discount factors and high productivities, but it is not correlated with either monetary or …scal policy. We just analyzed the conditional marginal distribution of every individual exogenous state. We can also study the bivariate conditional distributions of the exogenous states:
where S j;t is the j th element of S t and i; j 2 f2; : : : ; 5g. We approximate (12) by:
(f(S i;t ; S j;t ) 2 A i A j g j fR t = 1g) ' Figure 5 .4 plots the four most interesting of these bivariate distributions. In the top left panel we see how the high productivity shock and the high preference shock comove at the ZLB. We are at the ZLB precisely because these two shocks are simultaneously high.
In the top right panel we see a smaller comovement between high discount factors and the monetary policy shock. Not surprisingly, in the bottom left panel we observe again the lack of comovement between the monetary policy shock and productivity. Finally, the bottom right panel shows there is little comovement between government expenditure and productivity. In order to analyze this issue, …gure 5.5 compares the distributions of consumption, output, and in ‡ation. The …rst row represents the unconditional distribution of the three variables.
In particular, (variable t ) for variable t 2 fc; y; g to be approximated by:
Here we do not condition on being at the ZLB because we use the unconditional distributions as a reference. The second row shows the same distribution conditional of being at the ZLB, that is (variable t j fR t = 1g), approximating it by:
(fvariable t 2 Ag j fR t = 1g) '
The third row conditions on being at the ZLB for four periods (variable t jR t 1;4 ) ; approximating it by:
(fvariable t 2 Ag jR t 1;4 ) ' and in ‡ation is -1.89 percent (in annualized terms), 4 percentage points less than its average at the unconditional distribution (2.1 percent). As shown in the third row, the distributions are even more skewed if we condition on being at the ZLB for four periods. The average values also get more negative. Consumption is on average 0.34 percent below its steady-state value, output is 0.32 percent below its steady state, and in ‡ation -2.83 percent (in annualized terms). We should not read the previous numbers as suggesting that the ZLB is a mild illness: in some bad events, the ZLB makes output drop 8.6 percent, consumption falls 8.2 percent, and in ‡ation is -13.5 percent. Given our rich stochastic structure, a spell at the ZLB is not always associated with de ‡ation. Out of the 300,000 simulations, our economy is at the ZLB in 16,588 periods, and in 562 of those, in ‡ation is positive (around 3 percent of the time 11 ), with an annualized average value of 0.29 percent.
Autopsy of a spell at the ZLB
The longest spell in our simulation lasts 25 quarters. This spell is triggered by a sharp spike in the discount rate combined with a positive productivity shock and a negative monetary policy shock. Since we can think about our discount factor shock as a proxy for demand shocks 11 Since the recent spell of the U.S. economy at the ZLB has been associated with mild in ‡ation, one can use this 3 percent as an account of that observation. In addition, we could include further mechanisms (such as an exogenous or endogenous mark-up shock) to increase this 3 percent. All that we need for the ZLB to induce negative outcomes is that in ‡ation does not go up enough to bring the real interest rate down as much as the economy would do with completely ‡exible prices. and the bottom right panel in ‡ation (the last three variables in deviations with respect to the steady state). In each panel there are two lines, one for the nonlinear approximation and one (to appreciate the di¤erences implied by solution methods) for the log-linear approximation.
The spell starts at period 25 and lasts until period 50. We plot some periods before and after to provide a frame for the reader for comparison. Several points are worth highlighting.
First, the ZLB is associated with low consumption, less hours, and with de ‡ation. Second, even if the economy is out of the ZLB by period 50, it is still quite close to it for many quarters (up to period 68), which shows that a model such as ours can generate (although admittedly with low probability) a "lost decade"of recession and de ‡ation. 12 Third, the linear dynamics departs from the nonlinear one in a signi…cant way when we are at (or close to) the ZLB. In particular, the recession is deeper and the de ‡ation acuter. Also, consumption goes down, while in the linearized world it goes up. Thus, a policy maker looking at the linearized world would misread the situation. This divergence in the paths for consumption is not a surprise because the nonlinear policy functions that we computed in the previous section curved down with respect to the linear approximations when at (or close to) the ZLB. .7 helps to understand the role of the ZLB. We plot the same path of the interest rate (from the nonlinear approximation) as in …gure 5.6, but we add Z t 1, the unconstrained net interest rate that the model would have computed in the absence of the bound. 13 During the spell, the economy would require a negative interest rate (as large as -22.5 percent) to induce the households to consume enough in response to the (temporarily) high discount factor and productivity shock. Since a negative interest rate is precluded, the economy must contract to reduce the desired level of savings. We analyze …scal policy with the help of our model. In …gure 5.8, we plot (in blue lines) the size of the government multiplier when the economy is outside the ZLB. Since the model is nonlinear, the multiplier depends on the point where we make our computation. A natural candidate is the unconditional mean of the states. Thus, the multiplier is computed as follows:
The size of the …scal multiplier
1. We …nd the unconditional means of output, y 1 , and government spending, G 1 .
2. Starting at those, we increase government consumption at impact by 1 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent (that is, if government consumption is 1, we raise it to either 1.01, 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3). As time goes by, government consumption follows its law of motion (2) back to its average level.
3. For each increase in government spending, we simulate the economy. Let y g;t and G g;t denote the new simulated paths where the subindex g indicates the economy has been bu¤eted by a government spending shock.
4. We compute the multiplier:
We calculate the response of the economy to di¤erent increases of government consumption because, when we solve the model nonlinearly, the marginal multiplier (the multiplier when government consumption goes up by an in…nitesimal amount) is di¤erent from the average multiplier (the multiplier when government consumption goes up by a discrete number).
We approximate the marginal multiplier with the multiplier that increases government consumption by 1 percent. The other three higher increases give us an idea of how the average multiplier changes with the size of the increment in government consumption. When the nominal interest rate is positive, though, …gure 5.8 tells us that the di¤erence between the marginal and the average multiplier is small. This is just another manifestation of the near linearity of the model in that situation. Outside the ZLB, the value of the multiplier at impact is around 0.5 (going from 0.54 when the increment is 1 percent to 0.47 when the increment is 30 percent), a relatively small number, but not unusual in New Keynesian models with a low labor elasticity, without liquidityconstrained households, and with a Taylor rule that responds to the output gap.
14 This value is also consistent with the analytic insights in Woodford (2011), who derives multipliers less than 1 when the economy is outside the ZLB and has parameter values commonly found in empirically estimated medium-sized DSGE models. The observation that the multiplier decreases with the size of the increase in government consumption suggests that we must be careful when we read the empirical evidence of …scal multipliers, as their estimated value may depend on the size of the observed changes in government consumption. Figure 5 .8 also displays the multiplier when the economy is at the ZLB (red crossed lines).
The multiplier is computed as follows:
1. We start at the unconditional mean of states except that, to force the economy into the ZLB, we set the discount factor 2 percent above its unconditional mean (at 1.014
instead of the calibrated mean 0.994). This shock sends the economy to the ZLB, on average, for 4 consecutive quarters in the absence of any additional shock during those periods. We call these unconditional means, y zlb 1 , and government spending, G zlb 1 .
2. With these states, we simulate the economy and store the time paths for output, y We now discuss some details of our exercise. We raise t to 1.014. Given our calibration, this raise corresponds to a roughly 8 standard deviations shock to the discount factor. This is a rare event that pushes us deeply into the ZLB territory. We picked it to generate a spell at the ZLB of average duration of 4 quarters (although, remember that this is just an average duration and that the economy actually faces a whole distribution of durations with shorter and longer durations possible). We select an average duration of 4 quarters to be close to other papers in the literature. This choice is consequential because in our economy the characteristics of the shock that bring you to the ZLB matter for the size of the multiplier (this is not the case in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011).
Several patterns are apparent from the red lines in …gure 5.8. First, the multiplier at the ZLB is signi…cantly above one, albeit smaller than the values reported in the literature (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011) . Second, as in the previous case, the multiplier declines as the size of the government shock increases. This is because, as the government shock increases, the expected number of periods at the ZLB decreases for a given discount factor shock. In our experiment, a 30 percent government shock pushes the economy, on average, out of the ZLB upon impact.
The natural question is to ask why the multiplier is smaller than the one reported in the literature, for instance by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) in a related environment. Our exercise is somewhat di¤erent from previous ones. First, in our model there is a rich stochastic structure: in any period the economy is hit by several shocks. Agents do not have perfect foresight of future events and the distribution of the number of periods at the ZLB is not degenerate. Second, the government expenditure follows its law of motion (2) regardless of whether or not the economy is at the ZLB. So, for instance, if a large government consumption shock pushes the economy out of the ZLB right away, government consumption would still be high for many quarters, lowering the multiplier. 15 Our experiment is a nice complement to other exercises in the literature and provides answers that policy-makers are interested in: neither governments nor agents know in real life for how many periods the economy will be at the ZLB, and government expenditure is di¢ cult to change once stimulus plans have been approved. Let us now analyze in detail how the nondegenerate distribution of the number of periods at the ZLB that the agents face a¤ects our results. To do this, we solve three versions of the model with three levels of volatility for the discount factor shock (column 1 of table 5.5). In each of the three cases, we increase-at time zero-the discount factor so that, on average, the economy stays at the ZLB for 4 periods. 16 We report the standard deviation of the periods at the ZLB (third column) and the impact …scal multiplier (fourth column). To compute these numbers (and for each version of our model), we simulate the economy 5; 000 times. As we reduce b , the multiplier falls, while the standard deviation of the number of periods at the ZLB grows. Because of the left censuring of the spell duration, even if the expected durations of the ZLB spell are constant across the three experiments, a higher standard deviation of the number of periods at the ZLB means a higher probability of ZLB spell durations shorter than four periods. For instance, this probability increases four percentage points from b = 0:0027 to b = 0:00175. Since, in these events, government expenditure pushes interest rates up, the total e¤ect of additional government expenditure on aggregate demand today is much lower. To evaluate how the expected number of periods at the ZLB a¤ects the …scal multiplier, …gure 5.9 shows the results when the discount factor is initially set to be 1:2 percent above its unconditional mean. This sends the economy to the ZLB, in the absence of additional shocks, on average for 2 quarters. The multiplier outside the ZLB is the same as before. But the multiplier at the ZLB is now smaller at only around 2 times larger than in normal times.
For an increment of 1 percent of government expenditure, the impact multiplier is 1.20, and it goes down to 1.00 when the increment is 30 percent. Figure 5 .9 illustrates, thus, how the size of the …scal multiplier depends on the expected duration of the spell at the ZLB without …scal shocks (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011 , document this point as well). The intuition comes directly from the Euler equation forwarded several periods. The longer we are expected to stay at the ZLB, the lower is the current demand for consumption (a lower consumption in the future imposes, by optimality, a lower consumption today).
Endogenous durations of spells at the ZLB
We complete our analysis by reporting the IRFs of the model (computed as we did for the …scal multipliers). The IRFs highlight how the duration of the spell at the ZLB is endogenous. This is a direct consequence of a multiplier less than 1. Additional government spending puts upside pressure on prices forcing the nominal interest rate to go up. Real interest rates follow suit, since the central bank follows the Taylor principle. Households take advantage of high interest rates and defer consumption for the future. Ultimately, output (and labor) rise above its unconditional mean, but by less than the increase in government spending. In contrast, when the economy is at the ZLB (red crossed line), consumption and output simultaneously go up in response to higher government spending. With the nominal interest rate locked at zero and rising in ‡ation, the real rate is below the value prevailing in the absence of the government stimulus. Hence, households prefer to reduce savings and consume more. Note that, when the government spending shock is small it does not a¤ect the expected duration of the ZLB spell (4 periods). Figure 5 .11 shows that a government shock of 10 percent pushes the economy out of the ZLB, on average, after three quarters. This is one period less than the expected duration without the government shocks. This shorter expected duration implies a smaller response of consumption today and, therefore, a smaller e¤ect of government spending at impact.
Yet the multiplier is still above one because the shock does not preclude the economy from immediately escaping the ZLB. Finally, for a su¢ ciently large government shock, the economy is expected to escape the ZLB (…gure 5.12) at impact. The rise in interest rates compresses consumption although not to the levels when the economy is unconstrained (blue line). The multiplier for this case is close to one but larger than when computed without the ZLB. European economies stay at the ZLB in the close future or the prospects of coming back to it are su¢ ciently high, these next steps seem to be a high priority for applied macroeconomists.
Appendix: Solving the Model
We explain now in further detail how we compute the model using a projection method.
First, however, we need to …nd the steady state as this centers the projection and serves as the point around which we log-linearize the model in the comparison exercise of section 4.
Steady state
The steady state is de…ned by the following equations (where now is not a variable but a parameter, the in ‡ation target): To solve these equations, we …rst get the variables: : Lastly, c; g, and y are determined using l=y; c=y; g=y; and l.
The projection method
Recall that the state variables of the model are price dispersion, v; the discount factor, t ; productivity, A t ; the monetary shock, m t ; and the government expenditure share, s g;t . Recall that we have de…ned a vector, S t = (v t 1 ; t ; A t ; m t ; s g;t ) ; where the …rst state, price dispersion, is endogenous, while the other four are exogenous.
De…ne a new vector,Ŝ
To de…ne the hypercube, we must choose bounds for the 5 To compute expectations, we use a degree 11 monomial formula from Stroud (1971, p. 323). 18 The formula provides k innovations f(" j;b ; " j;a ; " j;m ; " j;g )g k j=1 and weights fw j g k j=1 such that, for any function of interest h,
w j h(Ŝ j;t+1 ) whereŜ j;t+1 is found using the j th innovations and the time t informationŜ t and v t . 19 It is called a degree 11 rule because if h is a polynomial with degree less than or equal to 11, then the approximation is exact. We also check the solution using a Monte Carlo with 100,000 draws, which generates a slightly di¤erent solution. Speci…cally, the values at the collocation points di¤er by at most 0:0006 for log c, 0:0004 for log , and 0:0018 for log x 1 .
To solve forf , we use a time-iteration procedure as follows:
1. Guess on the values of log c, log , and log x 1 at each collocation point S i . This implicitly gives an approximating function b f that is de…ned over the entire state space.
2. Treating the approximations as the true time t + 1 functions, compute the value of the optimal time t functions at each collocation pointŜ i ; i = 1; : : : ; n; in the following way:
a. Fix an i. This gives the state today, (v t 1 ; t ; A t ; m t ; s g;t ).
b. Guess on t .
c. Calculate t from t .
d. Calculate v t from the law of motion for price dispersion using t and t . 18 See Judd (1998) for a discussion of monomial rules and formulas for degree 3 and degree 5 rules. Krueger, Kubler, and Malin (2011) use a degree 5 rule. We use a degree 11 formula because it has been recently documented that accurately evaluating expectations in dynamic equilibrium models is very important for overall accuracy (see, in a slightly di¤erent context, Judd, Maliar, and Maliar, 2011). To apply the formula, some slight adjustments must be made, as the weighting function is not exactly the Gaussian density. 19 Speci…cally,Ŝ j;t+1 = (v t ; (1 b ) log~ + b log t + b " j;b ; a log A t + a " j;a ; m " j;m ; g log s g;t + g " j;g ). Note that while v t is part ofŜ t+1 , it is a function of only v t 1 ; t ; t ; and parameters. e. Using v t , the state today, the innovations and weights from the monomial rule, and the time t + 1 functions, compute the expectations Here, t+1 and x 2;t+1 are calculated from t+1 and x 1;t+1 .
f. Using these expectations and the guess on t , calculate all remaining time t values:
1. c t =y t from the government expenditure shock.
2. x 2;t from its intertemporal equation.
3. x 1;t from x 2;t .
4. mc t from the intertemporal equation for x 1 .
5. The unique (c t ; R t ) pair using a guess-and-verify approach. 20 This is done in the following way:
1. First, assume R t > 1 and compute c t using the Euler equation, the Taylor rule, and the consumption-output ratio.
2. Second, check whether Z t as a function of c t is greater than 1. If it is, c t is optimal, and R t is equal to Z t . If it is not, then R t equals 1, and c t is
given by the Euler equation.
6. y t from c t and s g;t .
7. l t from aggregate supply as l t = y t v t =A t .
8. w t from the labor-leisure choice condition.
g. To check whether the initial guess on t was correct, computemc t = w t =A t . If jmc t mc t j is close, then stop. Otherwise, make a new guess on t and go to step c.
21 20 To see that this is unique, consider the following. First, de…ning the value of the expectation
as , from the Euler equation one has R t = 1=(c t ). Second, the Taylor rule with the zero lower bound can be manipulated to say R t = maxf c y t ; 1g where = R( t = ) y y (1 s g;t s g ) y m t :
From these two equations, it is easy to see there exists a unique (c t ; R t ) pair. 21 Actually, we use a slightly di¤erent stopping criteria. In particular, we use the Matlab routine fzero to …nd a zero of the residual function r( t ) =mc t ( t ) mc t ( t ). The routine brackets the equilibrium value of t in an interval [a; b] and progressively shrinks the bracket until b a < 2 10 16 apart.
3. Having found time t equilibrium values for log c; log ; and log x 1 at each of the collocation points, check how di¤erent they are from the t + 1 values. If the new values di¤er by less than 10 6 , stop. If they di¤er by more, use the time t values to update the guesses and go to step 2.
We tried several alternative procedures but found this one to be the most reliable. We encountered convergence problems for highly persistent shocks or large shocks. Making appropriate initial guesses for the functions is important when the ZLB binds often. To construct good guesses, we …rst solved the model for i.i.d. discount factor shocks-in which case the lower bound does not bind-and then progressively increased the persistence to its benchmark value.
